Gambia's Colonial Land Office: A Legacy of Wrong Direction

A recent series investigation revealed that in The Gambia, the seyfo and the alkalo administer land that the state claims ownership of, with no land transfers occurring without their official mark. This finding, detailed in Part 2 of the investigative series, shows a fundamental aspect of the nation's land administration system: the key role played by these traditional authorities in controlling land transactions, even as the state asserts ultimate ownership. Part 2 of the series specifically found that the seyfo and the alkalo administer land the state claims ownership of, and no transfer moves without their mark. This established mechanism means that despite state claims, the practical reality on the ground hinges on the approval and endorsement of these local leaders. The Gambia gained independence in 1965, inheriting its land office structure directly from the British Crown. This inheritance meant that the newly independent state continued to operate with an administrative framework designed and implemented by its former colonial power. The state, upon its formation, inherited the office as it stood from the Crown, including its established procedures and hierarchy. This inherited chain of command places the Minister, Governor, Seyfo, and Alkalo in sequence regarding land administration, forming a direct line of authority that has persisted for decades.

The National Land Policy for 2026 to 2035 formally designates the Seyfolu and the Alkalolu as the custodians of customary land. This policy explicitly names the Seyfolu and the Alkalolu as the custodians of customary land, further cementing their official role within the contemporary legal framework. Further findings from the series indicate that the office responsible for signing tenancies, originally constructed by the colonial Crown, was designed to face away from the local community. This particular detail notes a foundational issue: the physical and functional orientation of the land administration system was not conceived with community engagement as its primary objective. This office, inherited by the independent state, remains unchanged in its legal standing as of the 2026 law. Part 3 of the series specifically shows that the office that signs the tenancy was built by the colonial Crown to face away from the community, was inherited by the state, and stands unturned in the law of 2026. This continuity, from colonial design to modern legislation, suggests a deep-seated challenge in reorienting the system towards community-centric land management.

Colonial Imposition of Authority

Colonial Administrator RB Llewelyn sent his report on the year 1894 to London in May 1895, detailing changes in the administration of the Protectorate. This report provided a critical insight into the colonial government's restructuring efforts and its vision for governance in the region. Two ordinances were passed on December 27, 1894, which established a new administrative structure. These legislative acts were instrumental in formalizing the colonial grip on the territory and reshaping traditional power dynamics. The Protectorate was divided into 17 districts, each placed under a Head Chief. This division into 17 districts was a strategic move to compartmentalize and manage the territory more effectively under colonial rule. These chiefs were appointed by the Administrator and were directly responsible to him, taking orders from the colonial authority. Each district stood under a Head Chief, appointed by the Administrator, from whom he took orders and to whom he was responsible, thereby establishing a clear chain of command that bypassed traditional community structures.

Before the establishment of the Protectorate, local rulers typically answered downward to councils of elders within their communities. This traditional system ensured that leadership was accountable to the people it served, rooted in local customs and communal decision-making processes. The Crown reversed this traditional direction of authority, requiring rulers to answer upward to the colonial administration. This fundamental shift in accountability meant that local leaders, who once derived their legitimacy from their communities, now served as intermediaries for the colonial power, their authority flowing from above rather than below. This change also involved the reclassification of European-called kings as chiefs, a designation that carried a lesser rank under the new system. The Crown reclassified European-called kings as chiefs, a lesser rank, a move that diminished the perceived status and inherent power of indigenous rulers in the eyes of the colonial administration and, eventually, their own people. The colonial power took rule but never claimed to take ownership of the soil itself. While the Crown asserted its administrative control, it strategically avoided direct claims of land ownership, preferring to govern through existing structures rather than outright confiscation. The founding of the Protectorate system altered the standing of local rulers and fundamentally changed the direction of their office. Indeed, the founding of the Protectorate took the ruler's standing and the office's direction, irrevocably altering the relationship between the governing and the governed.

In the Foñi districts, the Jola people historically governed themselves without a system of chiefs. Their traditional governance structures were communal and decentralized, relying on consensus rather than a hierarchical chieftaincy. However, the Crown installed chiefs over Jola land, often drawn from Mandinka settlers, thereby imposing a new administrative layer. This imposition of chiefs, particularly those from a different ethnic group, served to further entrench colonial authority and disrupt indigenous self-governance. The role of the Travelling Commissioner, established in 1894, evolved over time. This position was key for the colonial administration to maintain oversight and control across the newly formed districts. This position later became known as the Divisional Commissioner, and by 2006, the title was changed to Governor, reflecting a continuity of the administrative function through different eras. This evolution from Travelling Commissioner in 1894 to Divisional Commissioner, and then to Governor in 2006, illustrates a persistent administrative lineage, where the core function of colonial oversight has been maintained through various titular changes.

The Land Act's Dual Legacy

The Lands (Provinces) Act, Act No 16 of 1945, formally vested the land of the Provinces in the District Authorities. This legislative act was a significant step in formalizing the administration of land under colonial law, shifting control to the district level. This legislative act declared that land is "held and administered for the use and common benefit… of the communities concerned," according to Section 4 of the Lands (Provinces) Act. Section 4 of the Lands (Provinces) Act explicitly declares that land is 'held and administered for the use and common benefit… of the communities concerned,' a statement that, on the surface, appears to prioritize communal welfare. However, the practical implications of this vesting of power in District Authorities, themselves products of the colonial system, often diverged from this stated ideal. The office initially established in 1894 to report to Bathurst was, by 1945, granted the responsibility of administering the land itself. The office created in 1894 to answer Bathurst was, in 1945, handed the ground itself to administer, marking a significant expansion of its powers from mere reporting to direct land management. This transition endowed a colonial-era administrative entity with substantial control over the most fundamental resource: land.

Over time, the Lands (Provinces) Act underwent a name change, becoming the Lands (Regions) Act. This change in nomenclature reflected a broader administrative restructuring within the independent Gambian state, yet the underlying principles and inherited structures largely remained intact. The office referenced in the 2026-2035 policy was constructed by the colonial Crown 131 years prior to that policy's timeframe. This historical longevity shows the deeply entrenched nature of these colonial-era institutions within the contemporary governance framework. Part 1 of the series questioned the legal basis by which the state claims ownership of land. This initial inquiry delved into the historical and legal precedents, seeking to understand the legitimacy of the state's assertion of ultimate land ownership in a system deeply influenced by colonial legacies. Part 2 of the series demonstrated how an owner was effectively transformed into a tenant under the prevailing system. This finding from Part 2 showed the owner made a tenant, noting a critical shift in land tenure that disempowered traditional landholders by reclassifying their inherent rights into mere tenancy under state and traditional authority. The implications of this transformation are profound, affecting countless individuals and communities across the nation.

Inherited Structure, Unchanged Direction

The office responsible for endorsing land transfers in The Gambia today continues the functions of the same office that endorsed the Kombo Coastal Belt leases in 1970. This enduring operational continuity notes a persistent challenge within the nation's land administration system, demonstrating that the mechanisms put in place during the colonial and immediate post-independence periods remain largely unchanged. The office that endorsed the Kombo Coastal Belt leases in 1970 endorses transfers today, a testament to the unbroken chain of administrative practice. The office's design and function, originating from the colonial era, have been cited as a barrier to community-oriented reform. This deeply rooted colonial heritage means that efforts to modernize or reorient land administration often confront structures and procedures that were never intended to serve the interests of the local populace in the first place.

According to observations, the inherent structure of the land office, established by the Crown, was never intended to prioritize engagement with local communities. This foundational design choice, made during the colonial period, means the office cannot easily be reoriented to serve community interests without fundamental changes to its inherited framework. The office cannot be reformed towards the community because the Crown never built it to face the community, a critical insight into the systemic challenges facing land reform efforts. The original purpose of the office was to serve the colonial administration, a direction that observers suggest remains largely unchanged in its operational ethos despite independence. This persistence of a colonial-era orientation means that the focus often remains on top-down control and administrative efficiency rather than bottom-up community empowerment and participatory land governance. The legacy of this colonial imposition continues to shape land administration in The Gambia, showing the complexities involved in decolonizing institutional structures and truly aligning them with the needs and aspirations of the independent nation's citizens.