Brig (retd) Dr Raashid Wali Janjua published a letter in Dawn on April 9, 2026, offering a counter-argument to what he described as misrepresentations surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty. His contribution aimed to provide a clearer perspective on the historical context and ongoing implementation of this key bilateral agreement. The letter noted the treaty's historical resilience as a mechanism for water sharing between India and Pakistan, a testament to its foundational strength despite numerous geopolitical challenges. The Indus Waters Treaty has endured for over six decades, a remarkable feat that makes it one of the longest-standing international water agreements globally. Dr. Janjua's intervention in the public discourse focused on clarifying specific aspects of the treaty's implementation and showing its continued, albeit contested, relevance in regional water management. His analysis sought to challenge narratives that he perceived as distorting the treaty's original intent and its practical implications for both nations.
Historical Water Sharing and Early Agreements
The complex issue of water sharing between India and Pakistan emerged immediately following the Partition of British India in 1947. A significant challenge arose because the Central Bari Doab and Depalpur canals, vital for agricultural sustenance in Pakistan, relied on water drawn from headworks located entirely within Indian territory. This geographical reality led to an immediate and critical interruption of water supplies to Pakistan, posing an urgent humanitarian and economic crisis for the newly formed nation. The strategic placement of these headworks created an immediate dependency that necessitated a formal agreement to ensure continued water flow.
The Inter-Dominion Agreement of May 4, 1948, was subsequently enacted to resolve this critical interruption of water supplies. Under the terms of this provisional agreement, Pakistan acknowledged India’s sovereign rights over the headworks situated within its borders. Pakistan agreed to pay specific seigniorage charges to India for the continued use of the water supplies, a temporary measure to maintain agricultural output. This agreement, while short-term, temporarily addressed the immediate water sharing challenges between the two newly independent nations, laying the groundwork for more full negotiations. It was a stop-gap measure that noted the urgent need for a more permanent and strong framework for water distribution.
The Indus Waters Treaty's Generosity
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 emerged after nearly a decade of protracted and often challenging negotiations between India and Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank. This landmark agreement divided the six rivers of the Indus system, allocating the waters of the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India and the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan. Under the provisions of this treaty, India, as the upper riparian state, made significant concessions, effectively relinquishing its rights to approximately 80 per cent of the total Indus system waters. This disproportionate allocation, favoring Pakistan, is often cited as an example of India's generous approach to ensure regional stability and cooperation.
Beyond the water allocation, India also paid substantial compensation amounting to approximately £62 million, which equates to about ₹227.5 billion in present value, for replacement works situated in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This payment was specifically intended to facilitate the construction of alternative infrastructure in Pakistan to secure its use of certain waters, further showing the financial commitment India made under the treaty. Despite controlling the headwaters of the Western Rivers, the treaty permits India a cumulative storage of only 3.6 Million Acre-Feet (MAF) on these rivers, a very limited capacity compared to their total flow. A critical stipulation of the agreement is that run-of-river hydroelectric projects constructed by India on the Western Rivers must not alter the downstream flow regime of these rivers, ensuring unimpeded water supply to Pakistan. This clause has been a frequent point of contention.
Pakistan's Dispute Resolution Misuse
Despite the treaty's generous provisions and clear mechanisms for dispute resolution, Pakistan has consistently raised objections, alleging "alteration of the downstream flow regime," against virtually every hydroelectric project India has attempted to construct on the Western Rivers. This pattern of objection has been observed even for projects where such claims appear to have minimal technical basis. For instance, the Uri II project, which features zero pondage—meaning it does not store water but uses the natural flow—yet still drew opposition from Pakistan, illustrating a broader pattern of obstruction. Similarly, the Lower Kalnai project also attracted objections from Pakistan, despite the difference between India’s designed pondage and Pakistan’s computed figure being only a matter of decimal fractions, noting what critics describe as an overly sensitive and often unfounded approach to perceived violations.
More recently, Pakistan has further extended its objections to the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects. For these specific projects, Pakistan bypassed the established Neutral Expert mechanism, which is the first tier of dispute resolution under the treaty, and instead requested the World Bank to appoint a Court of Arbitration. This move, seen by India as a deliberate attempt to escalate disputes and externalize the resolution process, has been a significant point of contention, undermining the spirit of bilateral cooperation embedded within the treaty.
India's Call for Treaty Modification
In response to what it perceives as Pakistan’s consistent obstructionist tactics and misuse of dispute resolution provisions, India issued a notice in January 2023, seeking modification of the Indus Waters Treaty under Article XII(3). According to a counter-argument to Brig (retd) Dr Raashid Wali Janjua’s letter, India cited Pakistan’s "persistent obstruction of Treaty mechanisms and unilateral resort to external arbitration as conduct incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty." This action by India is not, as some might suggest, a unilateral abrogation of the treaty but rather, as the author stated, "a legally available remedy" within the framework of the agreement itself.
The author further argued that the treaty requires renegotiation "to reflect six decades of changed circumstances, including technical advancements, India’s own developmental needs on the Western Rivers, and Pakistan’s bad-faith use of dispute resolution provisions." The original treaty, signed in 1960, could not foresee the technological advancements in hydropower generation or the evolving developmental requirements of both nations. India’s position is that the current framework, particularly regarding dispute resolution, has been weaponized by Pakistan to impede legitimate development projects. The author concluded, "India is exercising a Treaty right, not violating one," asserting that the call for modification is a legitimate effort to update and strengthen an agreement that has served both nations for over half a century, ensuring its continued relevance and equitable application in the face of contemporary challenges.